We study how constrained …scal policy can a¤ect macroeconomic stability and welfare in a two-region model of a monetary union with sticky prices and distortionary taxation. Both government spending and taxes can be used to stabilize regional variables; however, the best welfare outcome is obtained under some tax variability and constant regional in ‡ations. We use a variety of rules to characterize constrained …scal policy and …nd that strict …scal rules coupled with a monetary policy that targets union-wide in ‡ation result in regional in ‡ation stability and the welfare costs of such rules are not as unbearable as one would expect. Fiscal authorities can enhance welfare by targeting the regional output gap, while targeting regional in ‡ation is less successful since in ‡ation stability is guaranteed by the central bank.
Introduction
The creation of a monetary union implies that domestic monetary policy can not be used to respond to region-speci…c economic disturbances. Interest rates, in fact, can no longer serve to meet regional targets for in ‡ation and output and, for a region wishing to exert in ‡uence over its domestic economic conditions, …scal policy is the only instrument left for maneuver.
The use of …scal policy as a stabilization tool in a monetary union poses several questions:
Can regional …scal policy a¤ect domestic macroeconomic conditions and how? Are countrymembers bound by …scal constraints (as the ones imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact in the EMU) able to o¤set the e¤ects of shocks to regional variables? Can …scal constraints be sustainable? What are their welfare consequences? Are there alternative arrangements to …scal constraints that are welfare improving?
All these questions arise naturally in the European Monetary Union. The …scal framework exempli…ed in the Stability and Growth Pact (henceforth SGP) attempts to combine ‡exibility, for coping with cyclical downturns, with discipline, for deterring negative externalities produced by individual members' irresponsible policies. Since the SGP came into force in 1999, its implementation can be best characterized as mixed. The disappointing …scal performance in some European countries after 2001 has placed a considerable pressure in the implementation of the Pact. The crisis reached its peak when the ECOFIN decided to put on hold the excessive de…cit procedures for France and Germany, in November 2003. The Pact reform con…rms that the implied restrictions were too in ‡exible in light of a changing economic reality and that they represented an impediment to the evolution of the union-wide economy (See, e.g., Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) ). For that reason, the reform of the SGP in September 2005 allows for more ‡exibility in budgetary rules and puts stronger emphasis on debt and regional idiosyncrasies. Given that the SGP reform is still in the centre of academic debates, it is only natural to question the usefulness of …scal constraints, in general, and the relation between welfare and macroeconomic stability and the degree of tightness of …scal policy, in particular. This paper addresses these questions: It investigates how regional …scal policy can a¤ect regional in ‡ation and output in a two-region model of a monetary union where agents derive utility from private and public spending, prices are sticky and taxes are distortionary, and analyzes the macroeconomic and welfare properties of di¤erent types of …scal constraints.
In particular, we construct a DSGE model of a monetary union where regional government spending is …nanced with distortionary (income) taxation and study the dynamics of the economy under alternative …scal rules when regions are subject to asymmetric productivity shocks.
We …rst obtain an analytical expression for the welfare criterion that can be used to compare outcomes of di¤erent policies and characterize the optimal monetary and …scal policy problem.
In the optimal solution regional in ‡ations are stabilized and government consumption gaps are closed, while taxes vary relatively smoothly. We, then, consider general rules for …scal policy in the two regions that try to imitate the SGP requirements of the …scal policy performance and study the welfare and stability properties for di¤erent specializations of these rules. We formulate the …scal policy rules using taxes and/or government spending as instruments. We assume that the …scal instrument in each region responds simultaneously to changes in the real debt, or de…cit, from some target level and/or can be used for regional stabilization purposes.
The tightness of …scal constraints is not that unbearable in terms of welfare losses. Yet, when we contrast more ‡exible with rigid …scal rules we …nd that the …scal authorities can improve domestic welfare by targeting the regional output gap, while targeting regional in‡ation is less e¤ective when the central bank targets union-wide in ‡ation. Our results are robust to the …scal instrument used and to the …scal target adopted. We also …nd that using government spending to consolidate debt might result to instabilities and the welfare losses associated with a government spending rule that targets regional debt are positively related with the usefulness of public expenditure. Finally, our theoretical predictions are consistent with the empirical results for US states in Canova and Pappa (2005) who …nd that the second moments of macroeconomic variables in states with di¤erent budgetary restrictions are economically and statistically similar.
The literature so far has been mostly concentrated in analyzing monetary-…scal interactions in a monetary union. Most studies highlight that countercyclical …scal policy may create coordination failures between the central bank and regional …scal authorities. Dixit and Lambertini (2001, 2003) provide an excellent review of this literature. Others have studied the desirability of …scal constraints in a monetary union and reach con ‡icting conclusions. For example, Dixit (2001) shows that the …scal freedom at regional level might undermine the central bank's objectives and provides arguments in favor of …scal constraints; Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998) and Beetsma and Uhlig (1999) argue that …scal constraints improve welfare because they correct the debt bias originating from government myopia; Uhlig (2002) shows that budgetary rules help to avoid the free-riding problems arising from the interaction between many …scal and one monetary authority in the monetary union, while Chari and Kehoe (1998) and recently Adams and Billi (2004) claim that …scal constraints are not necessary when the monetary authorities can commit.
In the New Open Economy Macroeconomic Literature (NOEM) Beetsma and Jensen (2004 ), Canzoneri et. al. (2005 ), Ferrero (2005 and Gali and Monacelli (2005) also study optimal monetary and …scal policy in a currency area. Jensen (2004, 2005) employ di¤erent assumptions and techniques to derive an analytical expression for the welfare criterion. Gali and Monacelli (2005) study the problem of optimal monetary and …scal policy in a currency union composed of small open economies and do not allow for variable distortionary taxation in equilibrium, while Canzoneri et al. (2005) focus on the asymmetric e¤ects of monetary policy for di¤erent regions within a monetary union using a di¤erent modeling scheme and metric for welfare evaluations. Our study is mostly related to the work of Ferrero (2005) .
Relative to the latter, we endogenize government spending and allow agents to derive utility from public consumption (as in Gali and Monacelli (2005) ) and employ taxes on labor instead of VAT taxes as a tax instrument. Also, we mostly focus on the macroeconomic stability and welfare evaluation of di¤erent …scal rules for a given monetary policy and employ government spending and/or taxes as …scal instruments for regional stabilization instead of debt.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section describes the model. Section 3 examines equilibrium dynamics. Section 4 discusses optimal monetary and …scal policy in our currency area and section 5 studies the performance of di¤erent types of rules for regional de…cits and debts. Section 6 concludes.
The Model
The economy is a monetary union which consists of two regions, home and foreign, each populated by a continuum of identical, in…nitely lived agents. The representative household in each region is endowed with one unit of time, and derives utility from consuming a basket of goods produced in both regions. Agents also derive utility from a domestic public good which is provided by the government. There is no migration, so households supply labor to domestic …rms only.
Time is discrete. At each t = 0; 1; : : : , supply (productivity) shocks occur. Firms and households make their decisions after observing the shocks. International …nancial markets are complete. That is, all agents have access to an international …nancial market, where they can trade a state-contingent nominal bond. The government in each region decides the amount of government expenditure in domestic goods, lump sum taxes and taxes on labor, and the level of debt. Monetary policy is conducted at the union level by a central bank who sets the union-wide interest rate.
Representative Households
The preferences of households are symmetric across regions, so we present the problem of the representative household in the home region. Utility is characterized by the following function:
(2.1) where 0 < < 1 is the subjective discount factor, C t > 0 denotes private consumption, G t denotes government consumption that is valued positively by the private households when ! < 1; and L t 2 (0; 1) denotes hours worked, and E is an expectation operator.
The purchase of consumption goods is …nanced by after tax labor income, pro…t income, and lump-sum transfers from the government. The household can purchase nominal risk-free bonds from the domestic and the foreign government and has also access to an international …nancial market, where state-contingent nominal bonds can be traded. The period-budget constraint facing the household is given by
where P t is the price level, D t+1 is the holdings of the state-contingent nominal bond that pays one unit of currency in period t + 1 if a speci…ed state is realized, Q t;t+1 is the period-t price of such bonds, B t+1 is the holdings of the risk-free nominal government bonds in the two regions which yield (1 + R t ) in the coming period 1 , W t is the nominal wage rate, l t ; is a tax on labor income, t is the pro…t income, and t is a lump-sum transfer from the government.
The household maximizes (2.1) subject to (2.2). The supply of labor is, then, determined by:
which states that the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption equals the real after tax consumption wage. The optimal consumption-saving decision is described by
so that the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution equals the price of the state contingent bond. The decision regarding the government bonds de…nes the Euler equation:
The consumption basket consists of domestically produced and imported goods. Denote C Ht the composite of domestically produced goods, and C F t the composite of goods that are imported. Then, we de…ne:
Solving the household's expenditure-minimizing problem yields the following demand functions for domestically produced and imported goods:
where P Ht is the price index of domestically produced goods, and P F t is the price index of imported goods, which are related to the home price level P t by
Throughout the analysis, we assume that …rms set prices in the sellers'local currency and the law-of-one-price holds, so that the cost of imported goods in the home consumption basket is simply the price charged by foreign exporting …rms since the exchange rate is …xed in a monetary union.
Firms
There is a continuum of …rms producing di¤erentiated goods indexed in the interval [0; 1]. The production of goods requires labor input, with constant-returns-to-scale (CRS) technologies
where Y Ht (j) is the output of type-j goods sold in the domestic market; Y Ht (j) is the output of type-j goods exported to the foreign market; Y G Ht (j) is the output of type-j goods sold to the domestic government and A t is a productivity shock; and L t is the labor input. The logarithm of the productivity shock follows an AR(1) process, that is,
(2.10)
where " A t is a zero mean, iid normal process with …nite variance 2 A . Productivity shocks across regions can be correlated with a correlation coe¢ cient, A HF : We assume that the goods produced by …rms are transformed into …nal consumption according to
where > 1; denotes the elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated products and G t the composite of domestically produced goods purchased by the government.
The cost-minimizing problem of the …nal good sector implies demand functions for each type of goods:
where P Ht (j) is the price of type-j good, and
is the corresponding price index.
Firms are price takers in the input market and monopolistic competitors in the product markets. Following Calvo (1983) , at each t each domestic producer is allowed to reset her price with a constant probability, (1 ); independently of the time elapsed since the last adjustment.
Producers face domestic (private and public) and foreign demand for their product. Since they do not engage in international price discrimination and the exchange rate is …xed, the real exchange rate is equal to the ratio of foreign to domestic prices: q t = P t =P t : When a type-j producer receives a signal to change her price, she chooses her new price P Ht (j) so as to maximize her expected present value of pro…ts
where M C t is the nominal marginal cost, which is identical across …rms since all …rms face the same input market, and Y d t (j) is the demand schedule for type j good described by the sum of demands in (2.12), that is
The cost-minimizing problem of the …rm yields the marginal cost function
(2.14)
and a conditional labor demand function
The solution to the pro…t-maximizing problem gives the optimal pricing rule
(2.16) where = =( 1) measures the steady state markup.
Regional …scal variables
The …scal authority in the home region issues nominal debt, B t ; taxes nominal wage income at the rate l t and has access to lump sum taxes, t : These revenues …nance domestic government spending, G t , and interest payments on debt. The government budget constraint in the home region is given by:
where
Risk Sharing, Market Clearing and Aggregation
Since the state-contingent nominal bond is traded in the international …nancial market, the foreign household's optimal consumption-saving decision leads to
By combining this equation with its home region counterpart (2.4) and iterating with respect to t, we obtain a risk-sharing condition
where 0 = P 0 C 0 =P 0 C 0 . The risk-sharing condition links the ratio of foreign to domestic prices (i.e., the real exchange rate) to the marginal rate of substitution between consumption in the two regions, so that all households face identical relative price of consumption goods in the world market.
In equilibrium, state contingent bonds are in zero net supply in the world market, so that
Aggregate domestic demand in the home economy is given by:
where we have used the demand functions for domestic goods in (2.7) and (2.12) and their foreign counterparts, and the the risk-sharing condition (2.20). Similarly, we can show that aggregate demand in the foreign economy is:
Let S t = P F t = P Ht denote the terms of trade. Then, it follows from (2.21) and (2.22), along with (2.20), that the terms of trade is given by:
Equation (2.21) and the price index relation P t = P Ht P 1 F t imply that real domestic demand is given by
If we do the same for the foreign real domestic demand and use the risk sharing condition we …nd that aggregate consumption in the home region is given by:
Similar conditions hold for demand and consumption in the foreign region.
From (2.12) and (2.15), the aggregate demand for labor is given by
where H = R 1 0 (P H (j)= P H ) T dj is the domestic price dispersion index. To fully characterize the equilibrium we need to describe how monetary and …scal policy in each region is conducted. Our goal is to analyze the welfare and macroeconomic stability properties of di¤erent …scal policy arrangements for a given monetary policy. As a benchmark, we …rst analyze the optimal regime in which both …scal authorities and the central bank cooperate. We model such a regime by assuming that a world planner chooses the …scal instruments in the two regions and the monetary instrument so as to maximize world welfare. Then, we study the welfare and stability properties of alternative …scal rules for a given monetary policy.
We assume that regional governments commit to follow the …scal rules.
Equilibrium Dynamics
The optimizing conditions of households and …rms characterize the equilibrium in our tworegion economy. We denotex t =x t x n t the deviation of equilibrium variablex t from its ‡exible price levelx n t , and we refer to this variable as the gap. The private sector's optimizing conditions in log-linear form for the home region can be summarized as follows:
where Ht denotes the domestic growth rate of prices,ỹ t denotes the domestic output gap, e g t the government consumption gap, e s t the terms of trade gap and l t ; r t and a t ; a t the log deviations of the tax rate, the nominal interest rate, and the home and foreign productivity shocks from their steady state values, respectively. The constant = Further, the ‡exible price level of output is given by:
while government and private consumptions under ‡exible prices are:
Thus, systematic regional expenditure in the ‡exible price equilibrium should be procyclical responding positively to changes in domestic productivity. On the other hand, domestic consumption, due to risk sharing, should react positively to productivity shocks, independently from their origin. Also, the ‡exible price level of the terms of trade is given by:
That is, an increase in the relative productivity in the home economy tends to lower the relative price of home goods.
Equations (3.1) -(3.4) are crucial for understanding the results we obtain. Equation (3.1)
describes the Phillips-curve, relating domestic growth rate of prices to current and future marginal costs. Equation (3.2) has important implications for our results: real marginal costs in the home region can be a¤ected by regional …scal policy because the latter a¤ects the labor market variables. Taxes on labor income a¤ect real wages and, thus, marginal costs, while increases in government spending a¤ect marginal costs through their impact on demand and, thus, on employment. Moreover, domestic marginal costs are also a¤ected indirectly by foreign …scal policy since, with trade links, increases in foreign demand a¤ect the terms of trade (terms of trade externality). Also, foreign productivity shocks can a¤ect domestic real marginal costs both directly and indirectly. This is because they a¤ect the equilibrium value of the terms of trade, which, in turn, determines domestic and foreign demand of consumption goods. The importance of the foreign economic conditions, as well as the terms of trade on the domestic growth rate of prices declines as ! 1.
Equation ( Equations (3.4), (3.1) and (3.2) imply that regional in ‡ation stabilization is not compatible with the terms of trade stabilization. Thus, the ‡exible price equilibrium cannot be implemented by stabilizing real marginal costs, as in closed economies, or open economies with ‡exible exchange rates. This happens since by (3.4) the terms of trade under regional in ‡ation stability will deviate from their ‡exible price value and the reallocation of resources under ‡exible prices cannot be achieved. In other words, the constancy of the exchange rate in a currency area makes the implementation of the ‡exible price equilibrium unfeasible. Thus, the creation of the monetary union is costly (see Pappa (2004) ) despite the presence of additional instruments (government spending and taxes) to substitute for the lack of the exchange rate instrument.
To complete the analysis, we present the equation characterizing the dynamics of real debt in the home region in log-linear form:
where b ss is the steady state value of debt and t is a function of domestic and foreign
The evolution of debt in the foreign economy is de…ned by a similar equation. In order to characterize fully the equilibrium we need to de…ne how monetary and regional …scal policies are determined.
Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy
The optimal monetary and …scal policy problem can be described as the problem of a social planner that maximizes a weighted average of the two regions households utility functions, subject to the aggregate constraints in the two regions, the regional debts evolution and the de…nition of the terms of trade. The policy problem we analyze is under commitment from the part of the policymaker since, in this setting, the planner has incentives to default from her initial decision when she is given the possibility to reoptimize. In particular, the planner would choose to create high in ‡ation in the period she reoptimizes and keep in ‡ation low thereafter.
We solve for the approximate policy problem. In order to characterize this and compare alternative …scal policy arrangements we need a welfare metric. A natural welfare criterion in our model is the representative household's expected life-time utility. Following the approach described in Liu and Pappa (2005) 2 , we derive an analytical, quadratic expression for the welfare criterion based on second-order approximations to the period utility functions for the households in the home and the foreign region. We, then, …nd the allocations under optimal policy by maximizing the quadratic objective subject to the set of log-linear equilibrium conditions.
In order to derive the welfare objective, we …rst describe the steady state problem of the social planner. We, then, derive the objective through quadratic approximations to the two-regions representative households'utility around that steady state. Finally, we solve the optimal policy problem for small perturbations around the optimal steady state 3 .
We solve the steady state problem of the planner in two stages. In the …rst stage she chooses the steady-state levels of public and private consumption and labor in the two regions to maximize the union's welfare. In the second stage she chooses the level of lump-sum taxes that determine the level of debt in the steady state 4 . Since the population size is equal across countries, we assume that the planner assigns equal weights to each member country's national welfare. The problem of the planner is to maximize 
The optimal tax rates for the social planner are, then, given by
The optimal tax rate is negative. That is, the planner's optimal steady state solution involves a labor subsidy that exactly o¤sets the steady-state markup distortions. As a result, the steady-state equilibrium allocations for the planner coincide with those under perfect competition and are, hence, Pareto optimal. Finally, given a steady state level of debt to GDP ratio, lump sum taxes are set to satisfy the government budget constraint in the steady state. 3 The linearization of a model of …scal policy is always troubling (See Giavazzi et al. (2000) ). Fiscal policies have strong non-linear e¤ects and might involve explosive paths for debt without violating the transversality condition. Our approximate equilibrium avoids these problems by requiring solutions for the endogenous variables that deviate little from the optimal steady state. Thus, in the approximate problem strong non-linear e¤ects of …scal policy are ruled out. 4 The second stage problem is introduced to guarantee steady state debt to GDP ratios that match their data analogues for Germany and France. 5 Net exports are given by: N Xt = PHtC Ht P F t CF t = (1 )P t C t [1
For net exports to be zero in the steady state, the parameter 0 in the risk sharing condition 2.20 should be set equal to one.
In the appendix, we derive the planner's welfare objective, which is given by
where the period loss function is:
To gain some intuition for the planner's loss function (4.5) we can rewrite it as:
Since the planner chooses subsidy rates to fully o¤set all markup distortions, the ‡exible-price equilibrium allocations are Pareto optimal and the planner´s objective re ‡ects her willingness to close all the relative gaps when conducting optimal policy. In order, however, to minimize the private consumption gaps, the planner has to stabilize ‡uctuations in the terms-of-trade gap and to induce comovements in regional output with the terms of trade and with government consumption that guarantee movements in regional consumption under sticky prices that resemble the dynamics of consumption under ‡exible prices.
Notice that when the economy is closed, = 1; and agents derive no utility from government consumption, ! = 1; the welfare objective in (4.5) reduces to a similar expression as the one in Benigno and Woodford (2005) : On the other hand, for < 1 and ! = 1; the period loss utility in (4.5) becomes similar to the one presented in Ferrero (2005) . Also, our welfare criterion is comparable with the one presented in Gali and Monacelli (2005) The optimal monetary and …scal policy problem is to choose home and foreign in ‡ation, home and foreign output and government consumption gaps, tax rates 6 , next period home and 6 When lump-sum taxes are available, home and foreign de…cits and debts can be zero in equilibrium with no e¤ects for the macroeconomy. Hence, conclusions on the welfare e¤ects of …scal policy rules will di¤er depending on the type of taxation assumed. Since the assumption of variable distortionary taxation o¤ers more interesting trade-o¤s and dynamics, we will focus our analysis in the case of distortionary taxation and assume that lump-sum taxes are kept constant to their steady state values.
foreign debt and the union-wide interest rate to maximize the welfare objective (4.4) subject to the log linearized private sector's optimizing conditions summarized in (3.1)-(3.4), the debt evolution equation (3.8) and their foreign counterparts, as well as constraints on period-zero terms (so as to respect the initial conditions).
The …rst order conditions of the planner´s solution are described in the Appendix. As it was …rst documented in Ferrero (2005) , the main feature of the optimal policy plan is the unit root behavior of the Lagrange multipliers on debt. This is also inherited by the output, the government consumption and the terms of trade gap, as well as the real value of debt. In the optimal solution some tax smoothing occurs. This is because debt changes permanently to guarantee the sustainability of the intertemporal government budget constraint. Moreover, in the optimal solution in ‡ation is stationary (see also Ferrero (2005) ).
Optimal policy is characterized by the solution of the system of equations (3.1)-(3.3), (3.8)
and their foreign counterparts, equation (3.4) and the …rst order conditions of the optimal policy problem. Here we present only the qualitative features of the optimal plan. These will be used as a guide for the intuition of our results in the next section. We abstract from the complete characterization of the optimal solution, given the unit root behavior of most of the variables and its considerable complexity.
We can summarize the qualitative properties of the optimal solution as follows: regional in ‡ation rates and government consumption gaps are completely stabilized, while taxes and debt vary and, as a result, the regional output gaps are non-zero. Given the stabilization of regional in ‡ations, the terms of trade gap is also non-zero and, in turn, private consumptions deviate from their ‡exible price values as well. Thus, the planner opts for a policy of in ‡ation stabilization using the tax rate as an instrument for smoothing variations in real marginal costs and allows for variations in the private consumption and output gaps 7 . Such policy can be easily rationalized by inspecting the coe¢ cients on in ‡ation and private and public consumption gaps in (4.6): the coe¢ cients for regional in ‡ations are much higher than the coe¢ cients in front of the consumption gaps. This property of the optimal plan is essential to understand the results presented in the next section.
7 Collard and Dellas (2004) also …nd that in a closed economy with distortionary taxation the case of perfect price stability, although not optimal, it implies insigni…cant welfare losses. In di¤erent frameworks, Andersen (2000) and Von Hagen and Mundschenk (2002) ) show also that the presence of in ‡ation di¤erentials creates incentives for policy competition among regional …scal authorities and regional in ‡ation stability is an optimal outcome.
5 Constraints on regional debts and de…cits.
The previous section has underlined an important feature of our economy: in a monetary union the most advantageous reallocation of resources can be achieved when regional in ‡ations are stabilized. In this section we study what are the e¤ects that alternative constraints on debt and de…cit to GDP ratios have on regional stability and welfare. We assume that the central bank follows a monetary policy that targets union-wide in ‡ation, while regional …scal authorities commit to follow speci…c …scal policy rules.
We de…ne union-wide in ‡ation as:
We model the behavior of the central bank by assuming a Taylor-type of rule for the setting of the union-wide interest rate:
where r is a constant.
We consider general rules for …scal policy in the two regions that try to imitate the SGP requirements for …scal policy performance and study the welfare and stability properties for di¤erent specializations of these rules. The government de…cit is de…ned according to the accounting de…nition of the SGP, as the sum of government spending and interest payments on debt minus tax revenues. That is, DF t = R t B t + G t T t :
We formulate the …scal policy rules using both government spending and income taxes as tools, since both can be used to determine the …scal stance and can a¤ect marginal costs and output in equilibrium.
The two instruments are not allowed to be simultaneously active. When taxes vary according to (5.3), government spending is assumed to be constant and, by the same token, when government spending is used as the …scal instrument, taxes are assumed to be constant 8 .
We allow for the possibility of tax and government spending smoothing (0 g ; 1).
We also allow tax rates and government spending to respond simultaneously to changes in debt and de…cit from some target level, as well as to the growth rate of domestic prices and the regional output gap.
The parameters df ; b determine the speed of adjustment for the tax and government spending rules in (5.3) and (5.4). When df ; b assume high values, …scal policy is passive in the sense de…ned in Leeper (1991) and its role is constrained in generating su¢ cient tax revenues, or managing government spending to meet the debt/de…cit requirements. Instead, when df ; b assume values close to zero, …scal policy is active in the sense that it is not constrained by restrictions on the level of debt and de…cit and is allowed to engage in regional stabilization policies (when y ; > 0 ). Notice that the government debt evolution and the de…nition of de…cit imply that when regional …scal policies target de…cits they actually control the evolution of debt and vice versa. Thus, when, for example, the …scal instrument focuses on the stabilization of debt, de…cit is also under control. In what follows, we consider rules in which the tax rate and government spending target either debt, or de…cit 9 .
Thus, the rules de…ned in (5.3) We will analyze the welfare and macroeconomic stability properties of di¤erent variants of (5.3) and (5.4). Since our model does not have closed-form solutions under the rules speci…ed in (5.2) and (5.3)-(5.4), we resort to numerical simulations in order to calculate the welfare outcomes of di¤erent …scal policy regimes. For this purpose, we calibrate the parameters in the model using France and Germany to approximate the economies of the two-regions 10 . Our baseline calibration is summarized in Table 1 . We take periods to be quarters and set = 0:99, so that the steady-state annualized real interest rate is 4 percent. The parameter characterizing the share of imports in consumption 1 is set equal to 0.2. We set also 1 ! = 0:2 to capture the average share of government spending in total output in Germany and France. Steady state in ‡ation in both regions and union-wide is zero. The steady state debt to GDP ratio is set to 60 percent, which corresponds roughly to the average value of debt to GDP ratios for France 9 We have also considered speci…cations in which the policy is mixed and both df and b are positive. The results on the welfare costs of …scal restrictions are robust. 1 0 We believe that assuming symmetry for France and Germany is not an unreasonable assumption, although the two countries are not equally sized.
and Germany between 2000 and 2005 11 . We set = 10, so that the steady state markup is 11 percent; and = 0:75, so that price stickiness lasts one year on average. The standard deviation of both productivity shocks is equal to 0:01 and their persistence is set to 0.9. In all the analysis that follows monetary policy will be given and in all the experiments V U is set equal to 3.0. We start our analysis by assuming very strict rules in which de…cit and debt should remain constant at their steady state level.
Strict …scal rules
The case of constant de…cits and debt is obtained from the …scal rules in ( Table 2 . The rest of the rows report the welfare losses and the macroeconomic stability properties of the di¤erent regimes.
The welfare loss here is measured as the percentage of steady-state consumption equivalence, that is, the percentage increase in steady-state consumption required to keep the households indi¤erent between living in a world with optimal policy and in one with …scal constraints.
The presence of strict debt and de…cit constraints is costly. However, the losses, although considerable, are not as severe as one would expect. They range between 2.5 % to 3.4% of consumption equivalence. This is of a substantial magnitude but not extremely high, compared to the welfare losses stemming from other distortions in a two-country model, as, for example, the ine¢ cient ‡uctuations in the relative price of non-traded goods due to price stickiness in Liu and Pappa (2005) 12 .
In order to understand the intuition of this result, note that the constancy of debt and de…cits does not impede the achievement of an equilibrium where both regional (and, thus, union-wide) in ‡ations are stable. In other words, strict regional debt and de…cit constraints together with a union-wide in ‡ation target from the part of the central bank, can implement an equilibrium with regional in ‡ation stability, which is highly important for welfare. This is because when government spending and taxes move to balance the budget they do not a¤ect adversely the behavior of real marginal costs.
For example, suppose taxes is the …scal instrument that targets real debt (i.e., scenario (b)) and a positive productivity shock occurs. From (3.8), a positive productivity shock, other things equal, increases debt. Since in equilibrium taxes are negative, i.e., they subsidize employment, subsidies have to be reduced according to (5.3) so as to keep the debt and de…cit constant. These movements in taxation do not a¤ect marginal costs in equilibrium. This is because productivity shocks decrease marginal costs, but on the other hand the reductions in subsidies tend to increase them. Overall, marginal costs remain almost constant in equilibrium and, thus, in ‡ation is stabilized.
However, the movements in taxation and government spending do alter the behavior of the output and consumption gaps. Movements in taxes make output deviate from potential and movements in government spending under constant taxes imply a trade-o¤ between output, government consumption and in ‡ation stabilization in (3.2). Moreover, since the in ‡ation rates in the two regions remain almost constant, the terms of trade cannot adjust to implement the reallocation of consumption under ‡exible prices. This terms of trade behavior generates nonzero private consumption gaps in the two regions.
The variabilities of these gaps for the four di¤erent strict regimes are presented in Table 2 .
Variances and, thus, welfare are comparable across regimes except for regime (d). In regime (d), where government spending reacts to changes in debt, the trade-o¤s between output, government consumption gap and in ‡ation stabilization are more severe generating higher output gap and government spending gap variabilities. This, in turn, leads to higher welfare losses.
Flexibility in …scal rules
In what follows we study how increasing the ‡exibility of the …scal rules a¤ects regional stability and welfare in our two-region currency area. To this end we analyze the macroeconomic stability and welfare properties of the four regimes described in Table 2 , when we vary the coe¢ cients on in ‡ation and the output gap in (5.3) and (5.4).
As it has already been highlighted in Leeper (1991) for a closed economy, the interaction between active monetary and …scal policy might result into instability, i.e., indeterminacy of equilibria. For that reason, in what follows we concentrate in speci…cations (i.e., parameter value choices) for the policy rules that result to well behaved solutions.
In ‡ation Stabilization
We …rst consider more ‡exible …scal rules that target the domestic growth rate of prices in each region. To this end we allow to vary in the interval (0; 15) for tax rules and (0; 10) for government spending rules. The results are presented in Figure 1 . When …scal authorities in the two regions target the domestic growth rate of prices more aggressively welfare is improved in almost all cases 13 . This is because stronger regional in ‡ation targeting implies higher regional in ‡ation stability, which is very important for welfare, given the size of the weight of regional in ‡ation in the objective of the planner. However, since most of in ‡ation stabilization is achieved at the central level, the additional gains from in ‡ation stabilization at the regional level are relatively small. Hence, the welfare losses decrease with the size of but not substantially.
In general, there is more room for welfare improvements when …scal policy targets real de…cit. Observe that the circled lines in Figure 1 are steeper than the continuous lines. Under a tax rule welfare losses are reduced by approximately 30% and under a government spending rule by approximately 10% when the …scal authorities target de…cits, while the corresponding changes when …scal authorities target debt are minimal. In the case of a tax rule it is easy to understand the reasoning behind this result. Note that in the intercept, when = 0, a rigid tax rule that consolidates debt is associated with smaller welfare losses than a rigid tax rule that controls de…cits. Therefore, there is more scope for …scal activism in the latter case.
Moreover, when real de…cit is targeted, variations in the tax instrument are more e¤ective to control for regional in ‡ation, and, thus, to increase welfare than variations in government spending. Notice that the circled line in the left panel of Figure 1 is steeper than the slope of the circled line in the right panel. This is because varying taxes is less costly in terms of macroeconomic stability than varying government spending. To see this, notice that in (3.2) taxes can vary in response to productivity shocks to stabilize marginal costs without a¤ecting the gaps on output, government consumption and terms of trade. Instead, under constant taxes, when government consumption moves in response to productivity shocks, either the output, or the terms of trade gap has to change to keep marginal costs constant. This introduces a trade-o¤ that makes government spending a less e¤ective instrument.
Output gap stabilization
Can …scal policy improve welfare when it targets the regional output gap? The answer is yes and is depicted in the two panels of Figure 2 where we let y vary in the (0; 3) interval. Again, the left panel shows how variations in y change the consumption equivalence losses when the …scal instrument is income taxation and the right panel plots the case of variable government spending.
The general pattern is very similar to the case of in ‡ation stabilization except that welfare losses decrease with the size of y more substantially. Starting from a de…cit targeting regime, with a tax rule, regional output gap stabilization reduces welfare losses from 2.5% to 1.1%
of steady state consumption equivalence and with a government spending rule from 2.5% to 2.1%. Strengthening the reaction of regional policy to output gap variations (i.e., increasing y ) delivers higher welfare gains relative to strengthening the reaction of regional policy to in ‡ation variations (i.e., increasing ). The reasoning behind this pattern is quite intuitive. Since the central authority targets in ‡ation, regional policy complements the central authority´s policy by focusing on regional output stability.
What rule to choose?
The preceding analysis advocates that regional stabilization policies can improve welfare. In particular, the adoption of a regional output gap target from the …scal authorities can improve welfare substantially relative to the case of rigid de…cit or debt targeting. On the other hand, the adoption of a domestic growth rate of prices target is not fruitful as a goal for national …scal authorities in a monetary union when at the same time the central bank targets the union-wide in ‡ation rate.
The objective of the SGP reform that was agreed by the EU states in September 2005 is to enhance the economic relevance of the SGP framework and strengthen credibility and enforcement. Some of the key changes involving the de…cit criteria include (a) the presence of di¤erentiated "medium-term objectives" (henceforth, MTO) for every region in the EMU that take into account the economic characteristics and the cyclical position of each country, and (b) di¤erentiated adjustment e¤orts to the MTO that take into account the regional business cycle position. On the other hand, the reformed Pact prescribes an increasing focus on debt and sustainability. The debt surveillance framework is strengthened by applying the concept of a government debt ratio that is "su¢ ciently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace" in qualitative terms and by also taking into account macroeconomic conditions and debt dynamics 14 .
Our results justify the SGP reform: more ‡exibility should result to welfare gains and macroeconomic stability as long as …scal authorities engage in domestic stabilization policies.
Another important policy implication of our results is that regional …scal policy should focus on regional output gap stabilization. Thus, our analysis justi…es the adoption of di¤erentiated adjustment e¤orts to the MTO that take into account the regional business cycle position.
Further, our analysis suggests that, when rigid rules are considered necessary and when taxes are used to consolidate debt, it is preferable to adhere to rigid rules for debt rather than rigid budgetary requirements. The opposite when government spending is used to control the debt evolution. This mainly re ‡ects the fact that government spending is an inadequate instrument for controlling debt when government spending enhances private agents utility.
When government spending is adjusted to control debt deviations from target it deviates a lot from its natural level. As a result, its gap increases substantially a¤ecting negatively welfare (see Table 2 ). Thus, whether government spending is an adequate instrument for controlling debt depends on the assumed value of !. In Figure 3 we plot the welfare losses associated with regime (d) when ! varies in the (0.5, 1) interval. We …nd that when government spending is not enhancing private utility, i.e., as ! ! 1; adhering to strict government spending rules that consolidate debt is as (if not more) e¤ective as adhering to tax rules. Thus, our results point to the use of government expenditure items that do not enhance private utility as the most e¤ective …scal instrument for …scal consolidation and stabilization purposes.
Hence, our results tone well with the change of focus towards debt stabilization in the reformed Pact and the increased ‡exibility of the de…cit criteria. They further suggest the usage of taxes, or government expenditure that excludes government services such as hospitals, schooling etc. as …scal instruments for the control of regional debt. Furthermore, the tightness of …scal constraints is not that unbearable in terms of welfare costs. These results are in line with the empirical results of Canova and Pappa (2005) that …nd that macroeconomic stability is barely a¤ected by the presence of budgetary restrictions in the US states. They re ‡ect the fact that in our model welfare gains arise essentially from in ‡ation stabilization which is under the control of the central bank.
Finally, our results on the importance of price stability from the part of the central bank and …scal activism from the part of regional policymakers con…rm the theoretical results of Ferrero (2005) and Canzoneri et. al. (2005) on optimal monetary and …scal policy. The fact that the gains from …scal activism are relatively small in our framework re ‡ects mainly the absence of asymmetries across regions and the adoption of di¤erent …scal rules 15 .
Concluding Remarks and Possible extensions
Our analysis suggests that …scal policies with clear stabilization objectives and a monetary policy geared to price stability are fundamental for macroeconomic stability and welfare in a monetary union. When political distortions make the presence of strict constraints necessary, rigid constraints on debt are more e¤ective for enhancing welfare than constraints on de…cits. This is the case especially when regional authorities can move government expenditure items that do not a¤ect signi…cantly the private households welfare. Our results advocate the reform of the Pact in the EMU and suggest that there is still room for improvements concerning the stabilization tools and objectives of regional …scal policies.
However, we recognize that the current analysis cannot address all the issues raised in the reform of the SGP. First, in the current analysis we consider a union between two countries with similar economic characteristics, the EMU instead is composed by regions with very di¤erent economic structures and we conjecture that examining optimal …scal policy and …scal rules in an asymmetric framework will provide further insights for the design of sound …scal policies in a currency area. Second, …scal constraints are usually motivated by the presence of a political distortion which is absent in our framework making our analysis biased against the presence of budgetary restrictions. The incorporation of political distortions would enrich the framework for evaluating the desirability of …scal constraints. Finally, …scal policy coordination was also taken as given when examining the di¤erent …scal rules and their macroeconomic consequences, while in practice this is not guaranteed and the sustainability of …scal constraints is still an open issue in Europe. The derivation of welfare objectives for each regional authority in future work will help us analyze the sustainability of …scal constraints in monetary unions.
The results for the square of foreign output and price dispersion abroad are similar as in the home economy.
The social planner, then, constructs his objective by weighting equally the two regions household utilities. That is, the welfare objective of the planner is the sum of (7.1.1) and (7.1.5), where its regions'welfare is weighted by half, given equal population across countries.
This implies using (7.1.2) and (7.1.6), together with (7.1.3) and (7.1.7) that the social objective takes the form: where the last equality results from using equation (7.1.4).
Finally, to derive the welfare objective in terms of output gap we use the approximation of (2.24) and its foreign counterpart to substitute for the consumption gap in (7.1.8). The resulting expression is equation (4.5) in the text.
7.2 The …rst order conditions of the optimal policy problem of Section 4
(not for publication)
If we denote with i ;the lagrange multipliers in front of the constraints (3.1)-(3.3) and the debt evolution equation (3.8) and their foreign counterparts, the …rst order condition with respect to Ht is given by:
The …rst order condition with respect to Foreign domestic growth rate of prices:
The …rst order condition with respect to the Home region output gap: (1 !)
The …rst order condition with respect to the interest rate:
The …rst order condition with respect to taxes at Home:
The …rst order condition with respect to next period Home debt:
The …rst order condition with respect to next period Foreign debt: 
